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Abstract. We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting in which
an agent’s utility may decrease or increase when an item is allocated.
We take the group envy-freeness concept that is well-established in the
literature and present stronger and relaxed versions that are especially
suitable for the allocation of indivisible items. Of particular interest is
a concept called group envy-freeness up to one item (GEF1). We then
present a clear taxonomy of the fairness concepts. We study which fair-
ness concepts guarantee the existence of a fair allocation under which
preference domain. For two natural classes of additive utilities, we de-
sign polynomial-time algorithms to compute a GEF1 allocation. We also
prove that checking whether a given allocation satisfies GEF1 is coNP-
complete when there are either only goods, only chores or both.
1 Introduction
Fair division deals with the problem of assigning items to agents in the fairest
way possible. Many fairness concepts have been proposed for this and envy-
freeness (EF) is viewed as the gold standard one. It stipulates that for any pair
of agents, no agent should prefer what the other got instead of her own share.
However, the concept does not provide any fairness guarantees when comparing
groups of agents. Envy-freeness also has a well-known tension with efficiency
goals (Caragiannis, Kaklamanis, Kanellopoulos, and Kyropoulou, 2012).
Berliant, Thomson, and Dunz (1992) introduced group envy-freeness (GEF).
It generalizes envy-freeness for equal-sized groups of agents instead of considering
only pairs of agents. One particularly desirable aspect of group envy-freeness is
that it implies both envy-freeness and Pareto-optimality, the central concepts
for fairness and efficiency respectively.
Recently, Conitzer, Freeman, Shah, and Vaughan (2019) generalized group-
envy freeness for indivisible items and groups of different size by introducing
group-fairness (GF). Since they considered indivisible items, guaranteeing GF
allocations is impossible. They thus proposed two relaxations of group-fairness.
These relaxations are similar in spirit to the well-studied weakening of envy-
freeness called envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) which requires no envy be-
tween any two agents as long as one agent gets rids of one of her goods. Alloca-
2 Haris Aziz and Simon Rey
tions satisfying the relaxations of group-fairness can always be satisfied and can
be computed in pseudo-polynomial time.
In their paper, Conitzer et al. (2019) assumed that the items allocated are
“goods” for which agents have positive utility. Therefore the concepts and results
do not apply to allocations scenarios in which tasks or chores are to be divided
among agents. Although the definition of group-fairness and group-envy freeness
can be extended seamlessly when there are either only chores or goods and
chores, their relaxations do not. In this paper, we take inspiration from the GF
and GEF concepts and define several variants and relaxations of them that are
well-defined for the more general setting of goods and chores. Our approach is
similar in spirit to the work of Aziz, Caragiannis, Igarashi, and Walsh (2019b)
who presented general definitions for fairness concepts that apply as well to the
case of goods and for chores.
Contributions Our first conceptual contribution is to formalize relaxations of
GEF for the case of goods and chores. We give general definitions which ap-
ply seamlessly to non-additive preference or even ordinal preferences. The main
relaxation is GEF1 which we show to be incomparable to the relaxations of
group-fairness (GF). A stronger counterpart of GEF1, called s-GEF1, is intro-
duced when groups of different size are allowed. We clarify the logical relations
between these concepts through a clear taxonomy depicted in Figure 1.
We present two key existence and algorithmic results. First, we design a
polynomial-time algorithm that always computes a GEF1 allocation for the case
of identical utilities. The proof relies on interesting connections with two-sided
matching and it invokes Hall’s marriage theorem. We then focus on a natural
class of mixed utilities called ternary symmetric utilities and design an algorithm
that returns an allocation that satisfies GEF1. This algorithm involves network
flows and makes use of several transformations of the utility functions. The
results also provide additional insights on the connection between Nash social
welfare and leximin welfare.
We then show that GEF1 allocations do not always exist for monotone utili-
ties even with only goods. We also show that allocations satisfying the stronger
concepts and group-proportionality are not guaranteed to exist.
We prove that checking whether a given allocation satisfies GEF1 is coNP-
complete for the cases of only goods, only chores and both.
We give sketches of the proofs for most of our results to present the key ideas.
The complete proofs are in the appendix.
2 Related Work
Fair division is a dynamic field in both economics and computer science (Brams
and Taylor, 1996, Moulin, 2004, Bouveret, Chevaleyre, and Maudet, 2016, Lang
and Rothe, 2016). The prominent fairness concept is envy-freeness (EF) (Foley,
1967) but an EF allocation may not exist for indivisible items. Checking whether
there exists an EF allocation is NP-complete even for additive binary utili-
ties (Aziz, Gaspers, Mackenzie, and Walsh, 2015). Several relaxations have been
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considered to overcome this, in particular envy-freeness up to one good (EF1)
(Budish, 2011) which always exists (Lipton, Markakis, Mossel, and Saberi, 2004).
Caragiannis, Kurokawa, Moulin, Procaccia, Shah, and Wang (2016) proved the
existence of allocation satisfying both EF1 and Pareto-optimality, and intro-
duced envy-freeness up to any good (EFX).
Berliant et al. (1992) generalized envy-freeness to groups of agents by in-
troducing group envy-freeness when items are divisible, extending the idea of
coalition fairness (Schmeidler and Vind, 1972). An allocation is group envy-free
if it is not possible to reallocation the items from one group of agents to another
in a way that would Pareto-dominates the current allocation. They proved exis-
tence of GEF allocations under some monotonicity assumptions and showed the
equivalence between EF and GEF. Husseinov (2011) extended it to weak group
envy-freeness by considering weak Pareto-improvement.
Similar generalizations have been proposed with indivisible items. Todo, Li,
Hu, Mouri, Iwasaki, and Yokoo (2011) introduced envy-freeness of a group toward
a group when monetary transfers between agents are allowed. Later Aleksandrov
and Walsh (2018) presented another definition of group envy-freeness between
groups of potentially different sizes. However, it relies on interpersonal compar-
isons which has received criticism in the social choice literature. Conitzer et al.
(2019) defined group-fairness for indivisible goods, a definition similar to that
of Berliant et al. (1992) but considering indivisible items and groups of different
size. They also introduced two “up to one” relaxations of group-fairness for which
they proved existence by using some variant of the Nash social welfare. Another
line of work in the same spirit is to consider pre-existing groups of agents, taken
as inputs of the procedures (Segal-Halevi and Suksompong, 2018, Kyropoulou,
Suksompong, and Voudouris, 2019). Similarly, Benabbou, Chakraborty, Elkind,
and Zick (2019) investigated the problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents
partitioned into types.
The chore division problem (Gardner, 1978), extends the classical fair di-
vision setting for items that are considered as chores for some agents. Brams
and Taylor (1996) and Segal-Halevi (2018) investigated the cake-cutting prob-
lem in this setting. Bogomolnaia, Moulin, Sandomirskiy, and Yanovskaya (2017)
studied mixture of divisible goods and chores. Indivisible chores have also been
considered (Aziz, Rauchecker, Schryen, and Walsh, 2017, Barman and Krish-
namurthy, 2017). Caragiannis et al. (2012) analysed the price of fairness and
showed several differences between goods and chores settings. Aziz et al. (2019b)
presented a general framework for indivisible goods and chores. In particular,
they provided a general definition for EF1 and algorithms for it.
3 Preliminaries
Let N be a set of n agents and O a set of m items. Agent i ∈ N has preferences
over sets of items, called bundle, represented by a utility function ui : 2
O →
R. We emphasize that agents can evaluate a bundle positively or negatively.
Preferences are said to be additive if for every subset of items O ⊆ O, we have
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ui(O) =
∑
o∈O ui(o). We assume additive preferences throughout the paper
except explicitly stated otherwise. Our definitions can be applied to non-additive
preferences. An item o ∈ O is a good for i if ui(o) ≥ 0 and chore for i if ui(o) ≤ 0.
Let O ⊆ O be a subset of items and N ⊆ N a subset of agents. An allocation
π =
〈
π1, . . . , π|N |
〉
over O and N is a vector of bundles πi ⊆ O for i ∈ N .
It satisfies indivisibility of the items, ∀i, j ∈ N s.t. i 6= j, πi ∩ πj = ∅, and
non-wastefulness:
⋃
i∈N πi = O. For a subset of agents N ⊆ N , we denote by
πN =
⋃
i∈N πi the set of items held by agents in N . We write respectively π
+
i
and π−i the sets of goods and chores in πi.
For a subset of items O ⊆ O and a subset of agents N ⊆ N , we denote by
Π(O,N) the set of all the allocations over O and N . If O 6= O, an allocation
π ∈ Π(O,N ) is called partial. A triplet I = 〈N ,O, (ui)i∈N 〉 is an instance. I is
the set of all the instances, I+ the set of instances with only goods and I− the
set of instances with only chores.
Let π be an allocation, we say that an allocation π′ Pareto-dominates π
if all agents are better off in π′ and at least one agent is strictly better off:
∀i ∈ N , ui(π′i) ≥ ui(πi) and ∃i ∈ N , ui(π
′
i) > ui(πi). An allocation π is said to be
Pareto-optimal if no other allocation Pareto-dominates it. Another common effi-
ciency criterion is to maximize the Nash social welfare, defined as
∏
i∈N |ui(πi)|.
In the following, we introduce the definitions of envy-freeness and its relax-
ations when dealing with goods and chores as presented by Aziz et al. (2019b).
Definition 1 (Envy-freeness (EF)). Let I = 〈N ,O, (ui)i∈N 〉 ∈ I be an in-
stance with both goods and chores. An allocation π ∈ Π(O,N ) is envy-free if
and only if: ∀i, j ∈ N , ui(πi) ≥ ui(πj).
It is well known that for some instances envy-free allocations does not exist.
Take for example two agents and one item. Two different relaxation of envy-
freeness can then be considered.
We say that an allocation π ∈ Π(O,N ) is envy-free up to one item (EF1) if:
∀i, j ∈ N , ∃O ⊆ πi ∪ πj , |O| ≤ 1, s.t. ui(πi\O) ≥ ui(πj\O).
Moreover, an allocation π ∈ Π(O,N ) is envy-free up to any item (EFX) if:
∀i, j ∈ N ,
{
∀o ∈ πi s.t. ui(πi)− ui(πi\{o}) < 0, ui(πi\{o}) ≥ ui(πj)
∀o ∈ πj s.t. ui(πj)− ui(πj\{o}) > 0, ui(πi) ≥ ui(πj\{o}).
Finally, an allocation π is proportional (PROP) if every agent is allocated
her proportional share: ∀i ∈ N , ui(πi) ≥
ui(O)
n
.
4 Fairness criteria for groups with goods and chores
In this section, we present our first contributions: a general definition for group
envy-freeness and its relaxations in the presence of goods and chores.
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Definition 2 (Group envy-freeness). Let I = 〈N ,O, (ui)i∈N 〉 ∈ I be an
instance with goods and chores. An allocation π ∈ Π(O,N ) is GEF if for every
S, T ⊆ N such that |S| = |T | 6= 0, there is no π′ ∈ Π (πT , S), such that:
∀i ∈ S,
|S|
|T |
ui (π
′
i) ≥ ui(πi),
with one inequality being strict.
We call the concept s-GEF if we do not impose the condition |S| = |T |.
In words, GEF states that there is no reallocation of πT to the agents in S
that would Pareto-dominates the current allocation for agents in S.
Note that s-GEF is equivalent to group-fairness (Conitzer et al., 2019). The
name group envy-freeness is taken from Berliant et al. (1992) who introduced it
for divisible items.
In the same spirit of EF1 and EFX, we introduce “up to one” and “up to
any” relaxations for group envy-freeness.
Definition 3 (Group envy-freeness up to one item, GEF1). An allocation
π ∈ Π(O,N ) is GEF1 if for every S, T ⊆ N where |S| = |T | 6= 0, for every
π′ ∈ Π (πT , S), and for every i ∈ S, there exists Oi ⊆ π
−
i ∪ π
′+
i , |Oi| ≤ 1, such
that
〈
|S|
|T |ui(π
′
i\Oi)
〉
i∈S
does not Pareto-dominate 〈ui(πi\Oi)〉i∈S.
We talk about s-GEF1 if we do not impose the condition |S| = |T |.
Definition 4 (Group envy-freeness up to any item, GEFX). An alloca-
tion π ∈ Π(O,N ) is GEFX if for every S, T ⊆ N where |S| = |T | 6= 0, for every
π′ ∈ Π (πT , S), for every i ∈ S, for every oi ⊆ π
−
i ∪ π
′+
i ,
〈
|S|
|T |ui(π
′
i\{oi})
〉
i∈S
does not Pareto-dominate 〈ui(πi\{oi})〉i∈S.
We call the concept s-GEFX if we do not impose the condition |S| = |T |.
Observe that with additive utility functions and for instances in I+, GEF1 is
equivalent to group fairness up to one good after (GF1A) as defined by Conitzer
et al. (2019). However, they also proposed group fairness up to one good before
(GF1B) which is no longer relevant when there are chores since removing items
cannot be done “before”. GEF1 can be seen as an argument in favour of GF1A.
Nevertheless, s-GEF1 is not equivalent to GF1A even when considering only
goods because of the way allocations are compared. Formally, 〈ui(πi ∪ {o})〉i∈S
is compared to
〈
|S|
|T |ui(π
′
i)
〉
i∈S
in GF1A while s-GEF1 compares 〈ui(πi)〉i∈S and〈
|S|
|T |ui(π
′
i\{o})
〉
i∈S
. The factor |S||T | is then applied differently. GF1A seems to
be specific to additive preferences while our intent is to define concepts that can
conveniently be used for both additive and non-additive preferences.
Following this aim for a general definition that is suitable for general prefer-
ence domains, we only consider groups of the same size to obtain ordinal proper-
ties. This is in the same spirit of envy-freeness and allows for more generality. It
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can also be argued that comparisons between same-sized groups implicitly cap-
tures comparisons between different sized groups: for a given k, one can compare
the best subgroup in S of size k with the worst subgroup of T of size k.
Although GEF implies Pareto-optimality and envy-freeness, GEF1 is more
stringent than the combination of the two criteria. The following example illus-
trates that even on very restricted preference domain these two concepts do not
imply GEF1.
Example 1. Consider the following instance with eight items, from o1 to o8, and
four agents, a1, a2, a3, a4 whose preferences are additive and single-peaked with
respect to the axis 〈o1, . . . , o8〉. The utilities for the singletons are as follows.
o1 o2 o3 o4 o5 o6 o7 o8
a1 −1 −1 1 1 0 0 0 0
a2 0 0 0 0 1 1 −1 −1
a3 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
a4 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
We call π the allocation represented by the squared items. π is clearly envy-
free: agents a3 and a4 have their maximal utility and their bundles give 0 util-
ity to agents a1 and a2. The allocation is moreover Pareto-optimal. However,
S = 〈a1, a2〉, T = 〈a3, a4〉, π′a1 = {o3, o4, o7, o8} and π
′
a2
= {o1, o2, o5, o6}, are
witnesses of a violation of GEF1. Agents in S are better off with π′ than with π
even after removing one good: utilities after removal are 〈1, 1〉 against 〈0, 0〉.
When preferences are additive, it is well known (see Aziz et al. (2019b) for
example) that proportionality is a relaxation of envy-freeness. In a similar spirit,
one can define group-proportionality, a relaxation of GEF that extends propor-
tionality to groups. It corresponds to GEF when T is fixed and set to N . Note
that it corresponds to the core as defined by Fain, Munagala, and Shah (2018).
Definition 5 (Group Proportionality). An allocation π ∈ Π(O,N ) is group
proportional (GP) if and only if for every S ⊆ N , there is no π′ ∈ Π(O, S), such
that ∀i ∈ S, |S|
n
ui (π
′
i) ≥ ui(πi), with at least one strict inequality.
We can then define the usual relaxations, GP1 and GPX. An allocation
π ∈ Π(O,N ) satisfies group proportionality up to one item (GP1) if for every
S ⊆ N , π′ ∈ Π(O, S), i ∈ S there exists Oi ⊆ π
−
i ∪ π
′+
i , |Oi| ≤ 1, such that〈
|S|
n
ui(π
′
i\Oi)
〉
i∈S
does not Pareto-dominate 〈ui(πi\Oi)〉i∈S . Group proportion-
ality up to any item (GPX) can then be defined naturally.
To conclude this section, we present in Figure 1 a taxonomy of the different
criteria discussed before. The links between s-GEF, GEF, GP and their relax-
ations are immediately derived from the definitions. Envy-freeness concepts are
implied by GEF and s-GEF when S and T are singletons. GP implies PROP
when S is a singleton. PO is implied by s-GEF, GEF and GP for S = T = N .
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s-GEF ≡ GF
PO GEF
GEFX
GEF1
GP
GPX
GP1
s-GEFX
s-GEF1
EF
EFX
EF1
PROP
Fig. 1. Logical relationship between fairness and efficiency criteria. Allocations satisfy-
ing concepts in dotted (resp. plain) are not (resp. are) guaranteed to exist. No existence
result is known for concepts in dashed.
5 The Egal-Sequential Algorithm for Identical Utilities
In this section, we present the Egal-Sequential Algorithm that returns a GEF1
allocation when preferences are identical. Identical preferences constitute an im-
portant and natural class of preferences especially if the item’s values are ob-
jective or publicly known. The algorithm allocates sequentially the items in de-
creasing order of absolute utility. The item to be allocated is given to the worse
off agent if it is a good and to the better off agent otherwise. We prove that
this ensures GEF1 in two steps. We first show that the Egal-Sequential Algo-
rithm returns an EFX allocation and then that every EFX allocation is also
GEF1 when preferences are identical. Preferences are identical if there exists a
common utility function u shared by all the agents: ∀i ∈ N , ui = u.
Lemma 1. For identical utilities, the Egal-Sequential Algorithm returns an al-
location π satisfying EFX and takes time O(max{m logm,mn}).
Sketch of the proof. We show that throughout an execution of the algorithm,
the partial allocation π is always EFX. If a chore o it to be allocated, it is given
to the best off agent i∗. The only possible increase in the envy is for i∗ to start
envying some agents. However, since preferences are identical, i∗ did not envy
anyone before getting o. Hence, removing o from πi∗ eliminates i
∗’s envy. Since
o is the smallest chore, π is EFX. The case when o is a chore is symmetric.
Lemma 2. Under identical utilities, any allocation satisfying EFX is GEF1.
Sketch of the proof. Consider an allocation π satisfying EFX but not GEF1.
There exist then S ⊆ N , T ⊆ N and π′ ∈ Π(πT , S) that are witnesses of a
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Algorithm 1: The Egal-Sequential Algorithm
Input: An instance I = 〈N ,O, (ui)i∈N )〉 with identical utility function u
Output: pi ∈ Π(O,N ) an allocation satisfying EFX and GEF1
1 Set pi to the empty allocation
2 Order items o1, . . . , om in O in decreasing order of |u(o)|
3 for j = 1 to m do
4 if u(oj) ≥ 0 then
5 Choose i∗ ∈ argmini∈N u(pii)
6 else
7 Choose i∗ ∈ argmaxi∈N u(pii)
8 Give oj to i
∗: pii∗ ← pii∗ ∪ {oj}
9 return pi
violation of GEF1. To get an increase up to one item, agents in S should receive
at least si = max{maxo∈pi′+
i
u(o),maxo∈pi−
i
−u(o)} additional utility. Violating
GEF1 then implies: ∀i ∈ S, u(π′i) − u(πi) ≥ si with one strict inequality. By
summing these over i ∈ S, and since utilities are identical and additive, we have:
u(πT )− u(πS) >
∑
i∈S
si. (1)
As π is EFX, the difference in utility between two agents cannot exceed
si,j = −min{mino∈pi+
j
−u(o),mino∈pi−
i
u(o)}. We have thus:
∀i, j ∈ N , si,j ≥ u(πj)− u(πi). (2)
Our goal is now to sum up inequalities describe in (2) to obtain a contradic-
tion with (1). We are thus looking for pairs (i, j) such that each i ∈ S and each
j ∈ T appears once and only once, and such that the sum of si,j over these pairs
is smaller than
∑
i∈S si.
Let us consider the bipartite graph G = 〈S ∪ T,E〉 where nodes represent
agents in S and in T . There is an edge (i, j) ∈ E between agents i ∈ S and j ∈ T
if and only if π′+i ∩ πj 6= ∅, that is, i receives some of j’s goods in π
′.
We consider a partition of S into S+ = {i ∈ S | u(πi) ≥ 0} and S− = S\S+.
Using Hall’s theorem (Hall, 1935) we show that there always exists a matching
M ⊆ S × T in G that matches all the agents in S+. The proof is omitted.
We then extend the matching M to match all the agents in S by arbitrarily
pairing each agent i ∈ S− with an unmatched agent in T . Let the extended
matching be called M∗. Observe that for any new pair of agents (i, k) ∈M∗\M ,
we have i ∈ S−, that is π−i 6= ∅, hence for any agent j ∈ T , we have:
si,j ≤ min
o∈pi−
i
u(o) ≤ max
o∈pi−
i
u(o) ≤ si. (3)
Moreover, for any pair of agents (i, j) ∈ E, we have π′+i ∩ πj 6= ∅, hence:
si ≥ max
o∈pi′+
i
u(o) ≥ max
o∈pi′+
i
∩pij
u(o) ≥ min
o∈pi+
j
u(o) ≥ si,j . (4)
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From (4) and (3) we get that
∑
(i,j)∈M∗ si,j ≤
∑
i∈S si. Hence, summing (2) over
(i, j) ∈ M∗ brings
∑
i∈S si ≥
∑
(i,j)∈M∗ si,j ≥ u(πT ) − u(πS). This contradicts
(1), we have thus proved that π satisfies both EFX and GEF1.
A direct consequence of the two previous lemmas is that a GEF1 allocation
can be computed by the Egal-Sequential Algorithm.
Theorem 1. For identical utilities, an allocation satisfying GEF1 always exists
and can be computed in linear time by the Egal-Sequential Algorithm.
Conitzer et al. (2019) showed that when preferences are identical their relax-
ation of group-fairness is implied by EFX. We significantly extend their result
in different ways. Firstly, our result applies in the case of mixed utilities where
preferences can model both goods and chores. Secondly, we provide a linear time
algorithm to compute GEF1 allocation with identical preferences. Finally, our
proof does not involve the Nash social welfare which is not a suitable solution
concept with chores.3
6 The Ternary Flow Algorithm
In this section, we focus on another restriction of the preferences, namely ternary
symmetric preferences. We say that agent ai has ternary symmetric preferences
if her preferences are additive and the utilities of the singletons are taken from
the set {−αi, 0, αi} for a given αi > 0.
We provide an algorithm that computes GEF1 allocations for ternary sym-
metric preferences. We do so by proving that any leximin-optimal allocation is
also GEF1 and by providing an algorithm returning a leximin-optimal allocation
in polynomial time. Similar links between leximin-optimality and envy-freeness
concepts have been observed by Plaut and Roughgarden (2018) for the case of
goods.
We first provide a characterization of Pareto-optimality for ternary symmet-
ric utilities.
Lemma 3. Let I = 〈N ,O, (ui)i∈N 〉 be an instance where (ui)i∈N describes a
profile of ternary symmetric utility functions. An allocation π ∈ Π(N ,O) is
Pareto-optimal if and only if for every item o ∈ O we have:


o ∈ πi with ui(o) > 0, iff maxj∈N uj(o) > 0,
o ∈ πi with ui(o) = 0, iff maxj∈N uj(o) = 0,
o ∈ πi with ui(o) < 0, iff maxj∈N uj(o) < 0.
Proof. Since Pareto-optimality is invariant under rescaling of utilities, assume
w.l.o.g. that αi = 1, ∀i ∈ N . Then, if the three conditions hold, every item is al-
located to an agent having maximal utility for it. This implies Pareto-optimality.
3 When considering only chores, either maximizing or minimizing the absolute Nash
social welfare does not imply EF1 for instance.
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Next, assume that one item o is allocated to an agent i who do not have
maximal utility for it: o is a chore (resp. neutral) for i and there is j who
considers o as either neutral or a good (resp. a good). Then transferring o from
i to j leads to a Pareto-improvement.
For a profile of ternary symmetric preferences (ui)i∈N , we introduce the
normalized profile(uNormi )i∈N that corresponds to (ui)i∈N but such that every αi
as been set to 1. For a normalized profile, every singleton has utility in {−1, 0, 1}.
This preference domain models statements such as “I like”, “I am indifferent”
and “I do not like”. It is close to the idea of approval and disapproval voting
(Brams and Fishburn, 1978, Felsenthal, 1989). In the fair division literature, it
has also been referred to as dichotomous preferences when there are only goods
(Bogomolnaia, Moulin, and Stong, 2005).
Next we introduce leximin optimality. For an allocation π we denote by
u(π) ∈ Rn the vector of the utilities in π sorted increasingly. For two vectors
u,v ∈ Rk, we say that u leximin-dominates v, written u ≻lex v, if there exits
an index i ≤ k such that uj = vj , ∀j < i, and ui > vi. Finally, an allocation π is
said to be leximin-optimal if there is no allocation π′ such that u(π) ≻lex u(π′).
Our algorithm makes used of the Nash Flow Algorithm presented by Dar-
mann and Schauer (2015). It computes in polynomial time an allocation maxi-
mizing the Nash social welfare when preferences are binary, i.e., the singletons’
utilities are in {0, 1}, by using a cost flow network (Schrijver, 2003, chapters 10
and 12).4 It constructs a specific network for which any minimum integer cost
flow corresponds to an allocation maximizing the Nash social welfare.
We first extend Darmann and Schauer (2015)’s result by showing that the
allocation returned by the Nash Flow Algorithm is also leximin-optimal.
Lemma 4. Let I = 〈N ,O, (ui)i∈N 〉 ∈ I+ be an instance with only goods and
where (ui)i∈N describes a profile of normalized ternary utility functions. An
allocation π is leximin-optimal if and only if it correspond to a minimum cost
integer flow in the network defined by the Nash Flow Algorithm.
This equivalence implies that any leximin-optimal allocation also maximizes
the Nash social welfare.
Corollary 1. Let I = 〈N ,O, (ui)i∈N 〉 ∈ I
+ be an instance with only goods and
where (ui)i∈N describes a profile of normalized ternary utility functions. Any
leximin-optimal allocation π maximizes the Nash social welfare.
Making use of the Nash Flow Algorithm, we propose the Ternary Flow Algo-
rithm (Algorithm 2). It computes a leximin-optimal allocation on the normalized
utilities which corresponds to a GEF1 allocation w.r.t. the original preferences.
4 Barman, Krishnamurthy, and Vaish (2018) also proposed a polynomial-time algo-
rithm for maximizing the Nash social welfare with binary utilities. However, it does
not imply leximin-optimality which we need to achieve GEF1.
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Algorithm 2: The Ternary Flow Algorithm
Input: An instance I = 〈N ,O, (ui)i∈N )〉 such that ∀i ∈ N , ui = u, for a given
utility function u
Output: pi ∈ Π(O,N ) a GEF1 allocation
1 Set O+ to {o ∈ O : maxi∈N ui(o) > 0}
2 Set O0 to {o ∈ O : maxi∈N ui(o) = 0}
3 Set O− to {o ∈ O : maxi∈N ui(o) < 0}
4 Consider new utility functions (u′i)i∈N such that
∀i ∈ N ,∀o ∈ O+, u′i(o) =
{
1 if uNormi (o) = 1,
0 otherwise
5 Run the Nash Flow Algorithm on I ′ =
〈
N , O+, (u′i)i∈N
〉
to obtain the partial
allocation pi
6 for o ∈ O− do
7 Allocate o to i∗ ∈ argmaxi∈N u
Norm
i (pii) and update pi
8 for o ∈ O0 do
9 Allocate o to i∗ ∈ argmini∈N ,uNorm
i
(o)=0 u
Norm
i (pii) and update pi
10 return pi
Lemma 5. For ternary symmetric preferences, the Ternary Flow Algorithm re-
turns allocations that are leximin-optimal for the normalized preferences.
Sketch of the proof. From Lemma 4 we know that π, returned by the Nash Flow
Algorithm, is leximin-optimal. We claim that allocating o ∈ O−, which is a chore
for everyone, to the best off agent maintains leximin-optimality. Finally, giving
items in O0 to agents who value them 0 also preserves leximin-optimality.
Lemma 6. If the preferences are normalised ternary symmetric, any leximin-
optimal allocation also satisfies GEF1.
Sketch of the proof. Let π be a leximin-optimal allocation. The proof is based
on the two following claims derived from leximin-optimality. Proofs are omitted.
Claim. If mini∈Nui(πi) < 0, then ∀j ∈ N , 0 ≤ uj(πj)−mini∈Nui(πi) ≤ 1.
Claim. For every i, j ∈ N , if uj(πj)−ui(πi) ≥ 2 then {o ∈ πj | ui(o) = 1}∪{o ∈
πi | uj(o) = −1} = ∅.
Assume toward a contradiction that there exist S, T and π′ which are wit-
nesses of a violation of GEF1. For any agent in S, her utility in π′ should be at
least one higher than in π, and there exists and agent in S who increases her
utility by at least two. The first claim implies that this is not possible if some
agent receives negative utility. The second claim states that each agent in T can
increase by at most one the utility of an agent in S. The violation of GEF1 is
therefore not possible and we have proved that π is both leximin-optimal and
GEF1 for the normalized preferences.
From Lemma 5 and 6, we derive the statement for GEF1 allocations.
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Theorem 2. Let I = 〈N ,O, (ui)i∈N 〉 ∈ I be an instance where (ui)i∈N de-
scribes a profile of ternary symmetric utility functions. A GEF1 allocation always
exists and can be computed in polynomial time via the Ternary Flow Algorithm.
Proof. Let π be the allocation returned by the Ternary Flow Algorithm. By
Lemma 5, π is leximin-optimal for normalized preferences and thus GEF1 for
these preferences (Lemma 6). Since no interpersonal comparison are required
for GEF1, any allocation satisfying it for normalized preferences also does for
non-normalized preferences. Allocation π therefore satisfies GEF1.
7 Non-existence of fair allocations
In this section, we present negative existence results for many GEF-related con-
cepts. We show in particular that as soon as we allow for groups of different size,
existence of fair allocations cannot be guaranteed.
Example 2. Let us consider an instance with three agents, a1, a2 and a3, and
three goods, o1, o2 and o3, where preferences are additive and defined as follows:
o1 o2 o3
a1 1 1 ǫ
a2 1 1 ǫ
a3 1 1 ǫ
with 0 < ǫ < 1/3. We call π the allocation defined by the squared items. First,
observe that S = {a3}, T = {a1, a2, a3} and the reallocation π′ = 〈{o1, o2, o3}〉
are witnesses of the violation of s-GEF1 in π:
|S|
|T |
u3(π
′
3\{o1}) =
1
3
u3({o2, o3}) =
1
3
(1 + ǫ) > u3(π3) = ǫ.
One can see that no allocation satisfies s-GEF1 in this example. Indeed, if an
agent receives more than one item then, another one would envy her up to one
item. There are therefore no guarantees of existence for allocations satisfying
s-GEFX and s-GEF. One can moreover see that π is not GP1, hence existence
GPX and GP allocation cannot be guaranteed.
Another interesting observation is that π maximizes the Nash social welfare
but is not s-GEF1.
Next, we show that while the existence of GEF1 allocations is guaranteed
when there are only goods with additive preferences, it is no longer the case for
monotonic preferences.
Example 3. Let us consider two agents, a1 and a2, whose preferences, u1 and
u2, are presented below. The preferences only depend on the number of items
received by each agent. Agent a2 gets positive utility only if she receives at least
3 items.
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X ⊆ O u1(X) u2(X)
|X | = 4 10 10
|X | = 3 6 6
|X | = 2 4 0
|X | = 1 1 0
|X | = 0 0 0
In such instance, the only allocations satisfying GEF1 for S = T = N are the
ones in which a1 gets either all the goods, none or exactly one. None of these
allocations are EF1, hence no allocation is GEF1.
8 Testing GEF1 is coNP-complete
We prove in this section that testing GEF1 is coNP-complete when there are
only goods, only chores and both of them. The decision problem is the following.
is-GEF1
Instance: An instance I = 〈N ,O, (ui)i∈N 〉 ∈ I and π ∈ Π(O,N ).
Question: Does π satisfy GEF1?
We use is-GEF1+ and is-GEF1− to refer to the same decision problem when
there are respectively only goods (I ∈ I+) and only chores (I ∈ I−).
Theorem 3. The problems is-GEF1, is-GEF1+ and is-GEF1− are strongly
coNP-complete.
Sketch of the proof. We present the reduction for the is-GEF1− problem. By
reducing the 3-Partition problem (Garey and Johnson, 1975), we show that
checking if π violates GEF1 when there are only chores is strongly NP-complete.
3-Partition
Instance: A multi-set of 3m numbers X = {x1, . . . , x3m} such that:
∀x ∈ X, 1/4 < x < 1/2 and
∑
x∈X x = m.
Question: Is there a partition (Xi)i∈J1,mK of X such that ∀i,
∑
x∈Xi
= 1 ?
Let X = {x1, . . . , x3m} be an instance of the 3-Partition problem. We
present in the following its corresponding instance (I, π) of the is-GEF1− prob-
lem. The set of chores is O = {g1, . . . , gm} ∪ {h1, . . . , hm} ∪ {l1, . . . , l3m} ∪
{o1, . . . , o2m} and the set of agents N = {a1, . . . , am} ∪ {b1, . . . , bm}. The utili-
ties of the singletons are as follows:
g1 . . . gm h1 . . . hm l1 l2 l3 . . . l3m−2 l3m−1 l3m o1 . . . om om+1 . . . o2m
a1 −m− ǫ −M −M −1− ǫ −M 0 −x1 −x2 −x3 · · · −x3m−2 −x3m−1 −x3m 0 −M −M −M −M −M
... −M
... −M −M
.. . −M −x1 −x2 −x3 · · · −x3m−2 −x3m−1 −x3m −M
... −M −M −M −M
am −M −M −m− ǫ −M −M −1− ǫ −x1 −x2 −x3 · · · −x3m−2 −x3m−1 −x3m −M −M 0 −M −M −M
b1 −x2 − x3 −M −M −M −M −M −x1 −x2 −x3 −M −M −M −M −M −M −M 0 −M −M
... −M
... −M −M −M −M −M −M −M
... −M −M −M −M −M −M −M
... −M
bm −M −M −x3m−1 − x3m −M −M −M −M −M −M −M −x3m−2 −x3m−1 −x3m −M −M −M −M −M 0
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where ǫ > 0 is a constant small enough, M is a constant greater than m+1 and
the xi are assumed to be ordered in a decreasing order: ∀i ∈ J1, 3mK, xi ≥ xi+1.
The initial allocation π ∈ Π(O,N ) is depicted by the boxed items in the
previous table. It is defined as πai = {gi} ∪ {hi} ∪ {oi} for every i ∈ J1,mK and
πbi = {l3i−2, l3i−1, l3i} ∪ {om+i} for all i ∈ J1,mK.
In the next step, omitted, we show that π violates GEF1 if and only if
there exists a suitable partition of X satisfying the 3-Partition problem. In
particular, we show that if two groups S and T are witnesses of a violation of
GEF1, then S = T = N .
In this proof, the only possible violations of GEF1 are such that S = T = N .
Hence, checking whether an allocation satisfies the Pareto-optimality relaxation
derived from GEF1, is also coNP-complete. These results are similar in flavour to
the results of de Keijzer, Bouveret, Klos, and Zhang (2009) and Aziz, Biro, Lang,
Lesca, and Monnot. (2019a) that testing Pareto-optimality is coNP-complete.
9 Conclusions
Inspired by the group envy-freeness concept and its relaxations for the case of
divisible goods, we formalized several relaxations of the concept for indivisible
goods and chores. The concepts have both fairness and efficiency flavours. Our
definitions are general and our key concepts work well for ordinal preferences as
well as cardinal utilities involving goods and chores. We clarified the relation of
GEF1 with other fairness concepts and presented several positive and negative
computational results.
Several interesting questions arise as a result of our study. The main ques-
tion left open is the existence of GEF1 allocations when there are goods and
chores. The question has been answered positively in the case of goods. However
the proof involves the Nash social welfare which cannot be used with chores.
Considering that protection of groups is one of the central concerns in new re-
search on algorithmic fairness, we envisage GEF1 and its variants to spur further
interesting work in the area.
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Appendix
A The Egal-Sequential Algorithm for Identical Utilities
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We call u the common utility function. We show by induction on the number
of items that have already been allocated that the Egal-Sequential Algorithm
maintains a partial allocation that is EFX. Let us denote by πk the partial
allocation constructed after allocating the k-th item.
The base case for k = 1 is straightforward. EFX is trivially satisfied by π1
as only one item has been allocated.
Let us now suppose that for a given k < m the partial allocation πk is EFX.
We show that πk+1 also satisfies EFX. Let o be the item that is allocated to agent
i∗ at the k + 1-th step of the algorithm. Let us distinguish two cases depending
on whether o is a good or a chore.
– If u(o) ≥ 0, the only change in the utilities of the agents is an increase
of i∗’s utility. The only possibility to violate EFX would therefore be for
agents to become envious up to any item of i∗. As i∗ ∈ argmini∈N u(πki ),
no agent envies i∗ in πk: ∀j ∈ N , u(πki∗) ≤ u(π
k
j ). This implies that ∀j ∈
N , u(πk+1i∗ \{o}) ≤ u(π
k+1
j ). Since o is the smallest item allocated at step k,
no agent envies i∗ up to any item in πk+1. Hence, πk+1 is EFX.
– If u(o) < 0, the only change in the utilities is a decrease of i∗’s utility.
Therefore, the only possibility for EFX to be violated would be if i∗ becomes
envious up to any item of another agent. Since i∗ ∈ argmaxi∈N u(πki ), i
∗
does not envy anyone in πk, that is, ∀j ∈ N , u(πki∗) ≥ u(π
k
j ). This implies
that ∀j ∈ N , u(πk+1i∗ \{o}) ≥ u(π
k+1
j ). Thus, i
∗ is still not envious. Hence,
πk+1 is still EFX.
We have then proved that the Egal-Sequential Algorithm returns EFX allo-
cations when preferences are identical.
Sorting items can be done in time in O(m logm). The for loop of the al-
gorithm uses m steps during which finding an agent with maximum or min-
imum utility can be done in time in O(n) hence the overall complexity is
O(max{m logm,mn}).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Let us consider an allocation π that satisfies EFX but not GEF1. Since pref-
erences are identical we can assume, without loss of generality, that no item
gives zero utility. If such items exist, they can be allocated to any agent without
changing anything. As π is not GEF1, there exist two groups S ⊆ N and T ⊆ N
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and a reallocation π′ ∈ Π(πT , S) such that ∀i ∈ S, ∀o ∈ π
−
i ∪ π
+
i , u(π
′
i\{o}) ≥
u(πi\{o}) with one inequality being strict. For i ∈ S, we introduce si defined as:
si = max{max
o∈pi′+
i
u(o), max
o∈pi−
i
−u(o), 0}.
Violating GEF1 then implies: ∀i ∈ S, u(π′i)−u(πi) ≥ si with one inequality being
strict. The 0 component in the definition of si is meant to tackle the case when
an agent i receives an empty allocation in π and no goods in π′. If πi = π
′+
i = ∅
we should have π−i = ∅ to get a GEF1 violation, hence we have u(πi) = u(π
′
i)
and si = 0 is a suitable bound.
By summing the inequalities coming from the violation of GEF1 over i ∈ S,
we obtain
∑
i∈S u(π
′
i) −
∑
i∈S u(πi) >
∑
i∈S si. Since utilities are identical and
additive this implies:
u(πT )− u(πS) >
∑
i∈S
si. (5)
Moreover, as π is EFX, we have ∀i, j ∈ N , ∀o ∈ π−i ∪ π
+
j , u(πi\{o}) ≥
u(πj\{o}). For i, j ∈ N , we introduce si,j defined by:
si,j = −min{min
o∈pi+
j
−u(o), min
o∈pi−
i
u(o), 0}.
The 0 component is once again here to take care of the case when π−i ∪ π
+
j = ∅.
We have thus:
∀i, j ∈ N , si,j ≥ u(πj)− u(πi). (6)
Our goal is now to sum up inequalities describe in (6) to obtain a contra-
diction with (5). We are looking for a set of pairs (i, j) such that each i ∈ S
and each j ∈ T appear once and only once, and such that the sum of si,j over
these pairs is smaller than
∑
i∈S si. To do so, we find a suitable matching in a
bipartite graph.
Let us consider the bipartite graph G = 〈S ∪ T,E〉 where nodes represent
agents in S and in T . There is an edge (i, j) ∈ E between agents i ∈ S and
j ∈ T if and only if π′+i ∩ πj 6= ∅, that is, i receives some of j’s goods in π
′. We
consider a partition S+ ∪ S− of S where:
S+ = {i ∈ S | u(πi) ≥ 0}
S− = {i ∈ S | u(πi) < 0}.
For X ⊆ S, we write N(X) its neighbourhood in the graph G: N(X) = {j ∈ T |
∃i ∈ X, (i, j) ∈ E}. A symmetric definition holds for N(Y ) where Y ⊆ T .
We claim that there always exists a matching M ⊆ S×T in G that matches
all the agents in S+. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that suchM does not
exist. From Hall’s theorem (Hall, 1935), there must exist X ⊆ S+ and Y ⊆ T
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such that Y = N(X) and |Y | < |X |. Let us assume that X is a smallest Hall’s
violation in G, and consider M ′ ⊆ X × Y a maximum matching between agents
in X and in Y .
We show in the following that M ′ always match all the agents in Y . To get a
better understanding, a diagram illustrating the different set of agents considered
is presented in Figure 2. Assume thatM ′ does no match all the agents in Y , Hall’s
theorem implies that there exist X ′ ⊆ X and Y ′ ⊆ Y such that X ′ = N(Y ′)
and |X ′| < |Y ′|. Then for X ′′ = X\X ′ and Y ′′ = Y \Y ′, we have |X ′′| > |Y ′′|
and N(X ′′) = Y ′′. Indeed, as |X | > |Y | we have |X | − |X ′| > |Y | − |X ′| and
thus |X ′′| > |Y ′′| since |X ′| < |Y ′|. Moreover it is clear that N(X ′′) = Y ′′ as
otherwise any agent in X ′′ linked to another agent in Y ′ is in N(Y ′) = X ′ and
can not be in X ′′. Overall, X ′′ constitutes a Hall’s violation for the existence of
M which is smaller than X . This contradicts the fact that X is the smallest such
Hall’s violation. Sets X ′ and Y ′ does not exist and M ′ matches all the agents in
Y .
S
S−
S+
X ′
X ′′
T
Y ′
Y ′′
Fig. 2. Sets of agents considered in the proof of Lemma 2.
We now turn back to the problem of showing thatM matches all the agents in
S+. AsM ′ matches all the agents in Y and u is additive, we have
∑
(i,j)∈M ′ u(πj) =
u(πY ). Hence, by summing inequalities (6) for (i, j) ∈M ′, we obtain:
u(πY )−
∑
(i,j)∈M ′
si,j ≤
∑
(i,j)∈M ′
u(πi) (7)
Moreover summing inequalities yielded by the violation of GEF1 over i ∈ S in
a similar manner as inequalities (5) brings u(πY )−
∑
i∈X si ≥ u(πX). Together
with (7), this leads to:
∑
(i,j)∈M ′
u(πi) +
∑
(i,j)∈M ′
si,j ≥ u(πY ) ≥ u(πX) +
∑
i∈X
si. (8)
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Observe that for any pair of agents (i, j) such that there is an edge between i
and j in G, we have:
si ≥ max
o∈pi′+
i
u(o) ≥ max
o∈pi′+
i
∩pij
u(o) ≥ min
o∈pi+
j
u(o) ≥ si,j . (9)
In addition, as |M ′| < |X |, it is clear that
∑
(i,j)∈M ′ u(πi) <
∑
i∈X u(πi) and
thus
∑
(i,j)∈M ′ u(πi) < u(πX). Overall, we have:
∑
(i,j)∈M ′
u(πi) +
∑
(i,j)∈M ′
si,j < u(πX) +
∑
i∈X
si,
which contradicts (8). Therefore, no Hall’s violation can exist and we have proved
that the matching M does match all the agents in S+.
Next we show that the existence of this matching M leads to a contradiction
on the fact that π is not GEF1. We extend the matching M to match all the
agents in S by arbitrarily pairing each agent i ∈ S− with an unmatched agent
in T . Let the extended matching be called M∗. Observe that for any new pair
of agents (i, k) ∈M∗\M , we have i ∈ S−, that is π−i 6= ∅. Hence, for any agent
j ∈ T , we have:
si,j ≤ min
o∈pi−
i
u(o) ≤ max
o∈pi−
i
u(o) ≤ si. (10)
By summing (6) over (i, j) ∈ M∗ we obtain
∑
(i,j)∈M∗ si,j ≥ u(πT ) − u(πS).
From (9) and (10) we get that
∑
(i,j)∈M∗ si,j ≤
∑
i∈S si, hence summing (6)
over (i, j) ∈ M∗ leads to a contradiction with (5). We have thus proved that π
satisfies both EFX and GEF1.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof is trivial, it just amounts at linking Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
B The Ternary Flow Algorithm
Let us first introduce briefly the theory of network flows as well as our notations.
A cost flow network is represented by a directed graph G = 〈V,E〉 whose nodes
v ∈ V are labelled with a demand d(v) ∈ R while edges e ∈ E are labelled by
a maximum capacity δ(e) ∈ R>0 and a cost c(e) ∈ R≥0. A flow f is a mapping
f : E → R≥0 where f(e) is the amount of flow passing through the edge e. By a
slight abuse of notation, we use f(v) for a node v ∈ V to denote the difference
between the outgoing flow and the incoming flow in v. A flow is realizable if
for every edge e ∈ E its capacity is not exceeded, f(e) ≤ δ(e), and for every
node v ∈ V its demand is satiated, f(v) = d(v). The cost of a realizable flow
f is defined by c(f) =
∑
e∈E f(e)c(e). A minimum cost flow is then a flow
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with minimal cost among the realizable flows. A flow is said to be integer if
∀e ∈ E, f(e) ∈ N.
Then we present the Nash Flow Algorithm proposed by Darmann and Schauer
(2015). Let I = 〈N ,O, (ui)i∈N 〉 ∈ I+ be an instance with only goods and where
preferences are normalized ternary symmetric. Note that since there are only
goods, the utilities for the singletons are in {0, 1}. The network G = 〈V,E〉 con-
sists in the set of nodes V = {s, t} ∪ N ∪ O ∪ {ti,j | i ∈ N , oj ∈ O} where the
demands are d(s) = m, d(t) = −m and d(v) = 0 for every v ∈ V \{s, t}. The
edge set E is defined by:
– for every item o ∈ O, the edge (s, o) is in E with capacity δ(s, o) = 1 and
cost c(s, o) = 0,
– for every agent i ∈ N , for every item o ∈ O such that ui(o) = 1, the edge
(o, i) is in E with capacity δ(o, i) = 1 and cost c(o, i) = 0,
– for every agent i ∈ N and every item oj ∈ O, two edges are in E: (i, ti,j)
with capacity δ(i, ti,j) = 1 and cost c(i, ti,j) = n
j and (ti,j , t) with capacity
δ(ti,j , t) = 1 and cost c(ti,j , t) = 0. In the following we refer to (i, ti,j) edges
as “t” edges.
Since the capacities are all integer, there always exists a minimum cost integer
flow of G by the integrality property. We have moreover a one-to-one correspon-
dence between integer flows in G and allocations in Π(N ,O). From a flow f , an
allocation π is defined by o ∈ πi if and only if f(o, i) = 1. From an allocation
π the flow f is defined by f(s, o) = 1 for each o ∈ O, f(o, i) = 1 if and only if
o ∈ πi for every o ∈ O and i ∈ N , and f(i, ti,j) = f(ti,j , t) = 1 for every i ∈ N
and 1 ≤ j ≤ ui(πi). An allocation π maximizes the Nash social welfare if and
only if it corresponds to a minimum cost integer flow of the network G.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4
For a flow f , we denote by fi, i ∈ N , the amount of flow passing through agent
node i, that is fi =
∑
j∈O f(j, i). Note that fi is then the number of good received
by agent i in the allocation corresponding to f . Since utilities are normalized
ternary, it is also i’s utility, ui(πi).
We first show that a leximin-optimal allocation π corresponds to a minimum
cost flow f . Let us suppose toward a contradiction that there exists two agents
i1 and i2 with fi1 − fi2 ≥ 2 and a good o such that (o, i2) ∈ E and f(o, i2) = 1.
We have thus ui1(o) = ui2(o) = 1. Consider then the allocation π
′ such that
π′k = πk, ∀k ∈ N\{i1, i2}, π
′
i1
= πi1\{o} and π
′
i2
= πi2 ∪ {o} and denote by f
′
the corresponding flow. Since fi1 − fi2 ≥ 2, agent i2 comes before agent i1 in
the lexmin ordering of the utilities in π. It is also the case in π′ since f ′i1 − f
′
i2
=
fi1 −fi2 −2. Moreover we have ui2(π
′
i2
) > ui2(πi2 ), hence u(π
′) ≻lex u(π) which
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is a contradiction. Agents i1 and i2 do not exist which is a sufficient condition
5
for f to be a minimum cost flow.
Next we show the other implication. For a flow f , we write f the vector of
the fi ordered from the lowest to the highest. Observe that f = u(π) for π the
allocation corresponding to f . Darmann and Schauer (2015, proof of Theorem
3.3, step 3) proved that all minimum cost integer flows have the same vector f .
We just proved that there exists a minimum cost integer flow f∗ corresponding
to a leximin-optimal allocation π∗, hence any minimum cost integer flow f is
such that f = f∗, which proves that the allocation π corresponding to f is
leximin-optimal.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 5
We show that along the execution of Algorithm 2, the partial allocation π is
always leximin-optimal.
Based on Lemma 4, we know that after line 5 of Algorithm 2, π is leximin-
optimal for the utility profile (u′i)i∈N . Since agents are only allocated items of
utility 1, π is also leximin-optimal for (uNormi )i∈N .
Next, we show by induction that π is always leximin-optimal according to
the normalized utilities throughout the first “for loop” (line 6) where items
in O− are allocated. In the following, leximin-optimality is according to the
normalized utilities. Consider one step of the loop, we call o ∈ O− the chore
that is to be allocated, µ the current allocation, that is leximin-optimal, and π
the allocation where o has been allocated to agent i∗ ∈ argmaxi∈N uNormi (πi). In
the following, we use u to refer to the leximin ordering according to preferences
(uNormi )i∈N . Suppose that π is not leximin-optimal, then there exist an allocation
π′ so that there exists an integer k ∈ J1, nK such that uj(π′) = uj(π), ∀j < k,
and uk(π
′) > uk(π). Since i
∗ ∈ argmaxi∈N uNormi (πi) we can assume without
loss of generality that i∗’s index in u(π) is n. From the induction hypothesis
we know that µ is leximin-optimal, hence n ≤ k as otherwise the allocation
obtained from π′ by deleting chore o would leximin-dominates µ. We have thus
k = n, that is
∑
i∈N ui(π
′) >
∑
i∈N ui(π). However since o is a chore for
every agent and µ is leximin-optimal, we know from Lemma 3 that π is Pareto-
optimal. Moreover, π′is also Pareto-optimal, since it is leximin-optimal, Lemma
3 implies then
∑
i∈N ui(π) =
∑
i∈N ui(π
′). This is a contraction. We have then
proved that the allocation π is still leximin-optimal after allocating chore o. The
induction is settled and after the first “for loop”, the partial allocation π is
leximin-optimal.
Finally, note that the items in O0 are allocated to agents that have 0 utility
for them. Hence, the allocation π is still leximin-optimal after the second “for
loop”. After this last loop, π is no longer a partial allocation, all the items have
5 Darmann and Schauer (2015, proof of Theorem 3.3, step 1) showed that an integer
flow f is a minimum cost flow if and only if ∀i ∈ N ,∀h s.t. 1 ≤ h ≤ fi, f(i, ti,h) = 1
and there is no sequence 〈i1, o1, i2, o2, . . . , ol−1, il〉 with fi1 − fil such that for all
1 ≤ h ≤ l − 1, we have (oh, ih+1) ∈ E and f(oh, ih) = 1.
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been allocated, hence Algorithm 2 returns π that is leximin-optimal according
to the normalized utilities.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 6
In the following we consider an allocation π, supposed to be leximin-optimal. We
first show that the agents’ utility can not be too different because of leximin-
optimality.
Claim. For every i, j ∈ N , if uj(πj)−ui(πi) ≥ 2 then {o ∈ πj | ui(o) = 1}∪{o ∈
πi | uj(o) = −1} = ∅.
Proof: Assume that there is an item o ∈ πj such that ui(o) = 1. Consider the
allocation π′ such that ∀k ∈ N\{i, j}, π′k = πk, π
′
i = πi∪{o}, π
′
j = πj\{o}. Since
uj(πj)−ui(πi) ≥ 2, i appears before j in u(π). Moreover, as uj(π′j)−ui(π
′
i) ≥ 0,
i also appears before j in u(π′). However, ui(π
′
i) > ui(πi) implies that u(π
′) ≻lex
u(π) which contradicts the fact that π is leximin-optimal. The case where there
exists an item o ∈ πi such that uj(o) = −1 is exactly symmetric. 
Next, we show our second claim that if one agent has negative utility for her
bundle, then all agent’s utility is at most one more.
Claim. If mini∈Nui(πi) < 0, then ∀i ∈ N , 0 ≤ ui(πi)−mini∈Nui(πi) ≤ 1.
Proof: Let k ∈ N be the agent with minimum utility in π. Assume that uk(πk) <
0, it means that k owns at least one chore o in π. Since π is Pareto-efficient, from
Lemma 3 we know that o is a chore for every agent in N . Let us assume that
there exists an agent j ∈ N such that uj(πj) > uk(πk) + 1, then since o is
also a chore for j, the allocation obtained by transferring o from k to j would
leximin-dominates π. This would contradict the leximin-optimality of π. 
For the sake of contradiction, assume that π is not GEF1, that is, there exist
two groups of agents S, T ⊆ N , and a reallocation π′ ∈ Π(πT , S) such that
∀i ∈ S, ∀o ∈ π−i ∪ π
+
i , u(π
′
i\{o}) ≥ u(πi\{o}) with one inequality being strict.
Suppose without loss of generality that the utilities of the agents in S (resp. T ),
written s1, . . . , s|S| (resp. t1, . . . , t|S|), are ordered increasingly. From Lemma 3
we know that for every agent j ∈ T and i ∈ S, ui(πj) ≤ uj(πj). Hence, tj is an
upper bound on the utility i can receive from j.
To get a GEF1 violation, a reallocation of the items in πT should give utility
at least si+1 to every agent i ∈ S with one agent receiving strictly more. Let us
denote by j∗ ∈ T the index of the first tj such that tj > sj +1. From the second
Claim, it cannot be the case that sj∗ < 0. Let us then assume that sj∗ ≥ 0. From
our first Claim, we know that in this case j∗ does not have any item considered
as goods for the agent corresponding to sj∗ , written i
∗. Since utilities are ordered
increasingly, it is also the case for every agent j > j∗. Hence i∗ can only receive
goods from agents j < j∗. However, for every agent j < j∗, we have sj = tj +1.
These agents can thus not provide enough goods to all agents i ≤ i∗ to get
GEF1 violation. This contradicts the existence of such agent j∗, which in turns
contradicts the existence of a GEF1 violation. We have thus proved that π is
both leximin-optimal and GEF1.
24 Haris Aziz and Simon Rey
B.4 Example of the Ternary Flow Algorithm
Let us illustrate on an example how Algorithm 2 proceeds. Consider once again
the instance presented in Example 1. The network flow constructed by the Nash
Flow Algorithm is presented in Figure 3. The allocation corresponding to the
minimum cost integer flow is π = 〈{o1, o2}, {o3, o4}, {o5, o6}, {o7, o8}〉. Since all
items are considered as good by at least one agent, the allocation returned by the
Nash Flow Algorithm is also the one returned by the Ternary Flow Algorithm.
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Fig. 3. Flow network constructed by the Nash Flow Algorithm on the instance de-
scribed in Example 1. Plain lines represent a minimum cost flow and dotted lines any
other edge. The cost of the edges are indicated next to them, 0 costs have been omitted.
C Testing GEF1 is coNP-complete
All the reductions are from the 3-partition problem, shown to be strongly
NP-complete by Garey and Johnson (1975). The problem is stated as follow:
3-Partition
Instance: A multi-set of 3m numbers X = {x1, . . . , x3m} such that:
∀x ∈ X, 1/4 < x < 1/2 and
∑
x∈X x = m.
Question: Is there a partition (Xi)i∈J1,mK of X s.t. ∀i,
∑
x∈Xi
= 1 ?
C.1 Proof of Theorem 3 for is-GEF1+
Let us consider X = {x1, . . . , x3m} an instance of the 3-Partition problem. We
construct an instance of the is-GEF1+ problem as follows. The set of agents
is N = {a1, . . . , am, b}, the set of items is O = {g1, . . . , gm} ∪ {h
j
i | i, j ∈
J1,mK, i 6= j} ∪ {l1, . . . , l3m}∪ {l∗1, l
∗
2} and the preferences of the agent are given
in the following table:
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g1 . . . gm h
2
1 . . . h
m
1 . . . h
1
m . . . h
m−1
m l1 . . . l3m l
∗
1 l
∗
2
a1 m+ 1− ǫ 0 0
m
m−1
m
m−1
m
m−1 0 0 0 0 x1 · · · x3m 0 0
... 0
. . . 0 0 0 0
. . . 0 0 0 x1 · · · x3m 0 0
am 0 0 m+ 1− ǫ 0 0 0 0
m
m−1
m
m−1
m
m−1 x1 · · · x3m 0 0
b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x1 · · · x3m m m
where ǫ > 0 is a constant small enough.
Let us explain these preferences in detail. Agent ai, i ∈ J1,mK, gives value
m+1− ǫ to good gi and 0 to the other “g” goods. She values
m
m−1 every h
j
i good
and 0 the other “h” goods. Her valuation for “l” goods follows the value of the
number in X and finally l∗1 and l
∗
2 provide her no value. Agent b only consider
goods l1, . . . , lm, l
∗
1 and l
∗
2 that are respectively valued as in X , m and m.
The initial allocation π ∈ Π(O,N ), given as a entry of the is-GEF1+ prob-
lem, is presented by the boxed items in the previous table. It is defined as follow:
πa1 = {g1} ∪ {h
1
i | j ∈ J2,mK} ∪ {l
∗
1},
πam = {gm} ∪ {h
m
j | j ∈ J1,m− 1K} ∪ {l
∗
2},
πai = {gi} ∪ {h
i
j | j ∈ J1,mK, j 6= i}, ∀i ∈ J2,m− 1K,
πb = {l1, . . . , l3m}.
Next, we prove that allocation π violates GEF1 if and only if there exists a
partition (Xi)i∈J1,mK of X satisfying the 3-Partition conditions.
We first show that if the allocation π is not GEF1, then the two groups S
and T witnessing this violation can only be N , that is S = T = N . To do so, let
us consider any two groups S and T and a reallocation π′ ∈ Π(πT , S) such that:
∀a ∈ S, ∀o ∈ π′a, ua(π
′
a\{o}) ≥ ua(πa),
with at least one inequality being strict. Such S, T and π′ define a violation of
GEF1.
First note that S = {b} is not a suitable witness as b can not improve her
utility by receiving one agent’s entire bundle (remember that |S| = |T |).
Let us then assume that there exist an agent ai in S, i ∈ J1,mK. Observe
that if π′ai = O\{lj | j ∈ J1, 3mK}, uai(π
′
ai
\{gi}) = m which is strictly lower
than her utility in π. Hence, to be better off in π′, ai should receive a subsets
of the “l” items. This yields that we should have b ∈ T . Note also that if π′ai =
{gi} ∪ {lj | j ∈ J1, 3mK}, uai(π
′
ai
\{gi}) = m. Hence there should exist another
agent aj in T , j ∈ J1,mK, j 6= i.
For now, we have proved that there should be two agents in T , aj and b, and
one in S, ai. As |T | = |S|, another agent should be in S.
– If an agent ai′ is in S, i
′ ∈ J1,mK, i′ 6= i, then ai and ai′ have to share the “l”
items than give a utility of m in total. Hence, to be better off, they should
receive some hki and h
k′
i′ items held by other “a” agents who should then be
in T . This argument can then be iterated until having all “a” are in T and
in S.
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– If agent b is in S, then to accept to give her “l” items, she should receive
l∗1 and l
∗
2 . Agents a1 and am should thus be in T . The previous argument
can then be applied. This yields to the fact that the only possible groups
witnessing a violation of GEF1 are S = T = N .
Let us now show that there exists a reallocation π′ ∈ Π(O, S) that lead
to a violation of GEF1, if and only if there exists a partition (Xi)i∈m of X
that respects the 3-Partition conditions. Observe that the set of items Oi =
{gi} ∪ {h
j
i | j ∈ J1,mK} is given positive value only by agent ai, hence Oi ⊆ π
′
i.
Oi\{gi} brings m− 1 utility to ai, hence to be better off, she needs to receive at
least 1 additional unit of utility from the “l” items. Overall the “l” items can be
divided so that it brings an additional 1 unit of utility to every agent ai if and
only if there exist a suitable partition of X . If such partition (Xi)i∈J1,mK exists,
then the reallocation π′ defined by:
π′ai = {gi} ∪ {h
j
i | j ∈ J1,mK, j 6= i} ∪Xi, ∀i ∈ J1,mK,
π′b = {l
∗
1, l
∗
2},
is a witness of the violation of GEF1. Otherwise, π satisfies GEF1.
Finally this reduction is clearly done in polynomial-time which concludes the
proof.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 3 for is-GEF1−
Let X = {x1, . . . , x3m} be an instance of the 3-Partition problem. We present
in the following its corresponding instance (I, π) of the is-GEF1− problem. The
set of chores isO = {g1, . . . , gm}∪{h1, . . . , hm}∪{l1, . . . , l3m}∪{o1, . . . , o2m} and
the set of agents N = {a1, . . . , am}∪{b1, . . . , bm}. The utilities of the singletons
are as follows.
g1 . . . gm h1 . . . hm l1 l2 l3 . . . l3m−2 l3m−1 l3m o1 . . . om om+1 . . . o2m
a1 −m− ǫ −M −M −1− ǫ −M 0 −x1 −x2 −x3 · · · −x3m−2 −x3m−1 −x3m 0 −M −M −M −M −M
... −M
... −M −M
.. . −M −x1 −x2 −x3 · · · −x3m−2 −x3m−1 −x3m −M
... −M −M −M −M
am −M −M −m− ǫ −M −M −1− ǫ −x1 −x2 −x3 · · · −x3m−2 −x3m−1 −x3m −M −M 0 −M −M −M
b1 −x2 − x3 −M −M −M −M −M −x1 −x2 −x3 −M −M −M −M −M −M −M 0 −M −M
... −M
... −M −M −M −M −M −M −M
... −M −M −M −M −M −M −M
... −M
bm −M −M −x3m−1 − x3m −M −M −M −M −M −M −M −x3m−2 −x3m−1 −x3m −M −M −M −M −M 0
where ǫ > 0 is a constant small enough, M is a constant greater than m+1 and
the xi are assumed to be ordered in a decreasing order: ∀i ∈ J1, 3mK, xi ≥ xi+1.
Let us explain these preferences in detail. Agent ai, i ∈ J1,mK, gives value
−m− ǫ to chore gi and −M ot any other “g” chore. Moreover, she values −1− ǫ
chore hi, 0 chore hi−1 (chore hm for agent a1) and −M the other “h” chores.
Her valuation for “l” chores follows the opposite of the values in X . Finally, her
utility for “o” chores is 0 for oi and −M for the others.
Agent bi, i ∈ J1,mK, values −x3i−1 − x3i chores gi, and −M all other “g”
chores. All “h” chores give her −M utility. Chores l3i−2, l3i−1 and l3i respectively
provide her x3i−2, x3i−1 and x3i utility while she values −M any other “l” chore.
Finally her utility for “o” chores is 0 for oi+m and −M for the others.
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The initial allocation π ∈ Π(O,N ), given as a entry of the is-GEF1− prob-
lem and represented by the boxed items in the previous table, is defined as
follow:
πai = {gi} ∪ {hi} ∪ {oi}, ∀i ∈ J1,mK,
πbi = {l3i−2, l3i−1, l3i} ∪ {om+i}, ∀i ∈ J1,mK.
Next, we prove that allocation π violates GEF1 if and only if there exists a
partition (Xi)i∈J1,mK of X satisfying the 3-Partition conditions.
We first show that if the allocation π is not GEF1, then the two groups S
and T witnessing this violation can only be N , that is S = T = N . To do so, let
us consider any two groups S and T and a reallocation π′ ∈ Π(πT , S) such that:
∀a ∈ S, ∀o ∈ πa, ua(π
′
a) ≥ ua(πa\{o}), (11)
with at least one inequality being strict. Such S, T and π′ define a violation of
GEF1. Note that as (11) should hold for any item o ∈ πa, it should hold in
particular if o is the worst chore in πa that is gi for agents ai and l3i−2 for agent
bi (remember that we assumed xi are decreasingly ordered). Hence (11) can be
reformulated as:
∀a ∈ S,
{
ua(π
′
a) ≥ −1− ǫ if a ∈ {a1, . . . , am},
ua(π
′
a) ≥ −x3i−1 − x3i if a = bi, i ∈ J1,mK,
(12)
with one inequality being strict.
Let us show that (12) can be satisfied if and only if S = T = N . To do so,
we first prove that S = T . Then, we show that the number of “a” agents in
T is equal to the number of “b” agents in T . Finally we prve that if agent ai
(resp. a1) is in T , then agent ai−1 (resp. am) should also be in T , proving that
{a1, . . . , am} ∈ T . All these facts put together show the claim.
Consider agent c ∈ T that can either be an “a” or “b” agent. Let k be the
index such that k = i if c = ai and k = i +m if c = bi. Observe that chore ok
is in πc and it can only be allocated to agent c for (12) to be satisfied as every
other agent have utility −M for it. We have thus T ⊆ S, and as |S| = |T | we
have S = T .
Let us then introduce two notations, na and nb, respectively corresponding
to the number of “a” agents and “b” agent in T , that is na = |{a1, . . . , am}∩ T |
and nb = |T | − na. Note that if ai ∈ T then bi should be in S as gi ∈ πai can
only be allocated to bi to satisfy (12). Remember that S = T , hence bi ∈ T and
thus na ≤ nb.
Moreover, observe that T ⊆ {b1, . . . , bm} would violated (12) as “b” agents
are interested only in the “l” chores they own among all “l” chores. Hence,
no reallocation among only “b” agents can be improving. Let us then assume
that there exists agent ai in T . As already mentioned, we have gi ∈ π′bi , hence
π′bi = {gi, oi+m} and (12) for bi is at equality. All “l” chores in πT should then be
reallocated to “a” agents as “b” can not received any additional chore. Remember
that ∀x ∈ X, 1/4 < x < 1/2, hence any subset of X of size strictly greater than
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4 has a sum strictly greater than 1. For a suitable ǫ it is then impossible to
reallocate more than 3 “l” items to an “a” agents without its utility being below
−1− ǫ. This implies that nb ≤ na hence na = nb.
In addition, there are exactly 3nb “l” chores in πT and as na = nb, each “a”
agent should be reallocated exactly 3 “l” items. It is then not possible for agent
ai to receive chore hi, this chore should then be allocated to agent ai−1 (am for
ai = a1). Hence, if ai ∈ T we should have ai−1 ∈ S (am for ai = a1) and thus in
T as S = T . This yields that all “a” agents are in T and thus also all “b” agents
as na = nb. We have thus S = T = N .
We now prove that for S = T = N , there exist a reallocation π′ satisfying (12)
if and only if there exists a partition (Xi)i∈J1,mK of X satisfying the conditions
of the 3-Partition problem.
Note that each gi chore should be allocated to bi in π
′, hence all “l” chores
should be divided among “a” agents. “h” chores are allocated to “a” agents
receiving 0 utility for it, similar reallocation is done for “o” chores. Hence (12)
is satisfied if and only if it is possible to divide the “l” items into m parts of
sum smaller than 1 + ǫ, that is of sum 1. For a suitable ǫ this is equivalent to
the existence of a partition of X satisfying the conditions of the 3-Partition
problem.
Finally this reduction is clearly done in polynomial-time which concludes the
proof.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 3 for is-GEF1
Since any instance of the is-GEF1+ or is-GEF1− problems is also an instance of
the is-GEF1 problem, the previous also prove that is-GEF1 is coNP-complete.
